Notwithstanding the appeal of the “one size fits all” approach that Baumeister et al. propose, we argue that there is no panacea for improving group performance. The concept of “differentiation of selves” constitutes an umbrella term for similar seeming but actually different constructs. Even the same type of “differentiation of selves” can be beneficial for some and harmful for other tasks.

Introductory essay / Peter Jones -- The usefulness of the arts and the humanities : the case of Descartes / Gábor Boros -- Roads of remembrance : the treatment of imagination and memory in Gerard's Essay on genius / Zsolt Komáromy -- Diderot's untimeliness / László Kisbali ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Melody vs. harmony : Rousseau, or, The aesthetics of vowels / Mária Ludassy ; transl. Zsolt Komáromy -- Judgement and taste : from Shakespeare to Shaftesbury / Ferenc Hörcher (...) -- Lord Shaftesbury's "aesthetic freedom" / Endre Szécsényi -- Why one should imitate the Greeks : on Winckelmann / Sándor Radnóti ; transl. Márton Dornbach -- Beauty or beast, or, Monstrous regiments? : Robertson and Burke on women and the public scene / László Kontler -- The concept of nature and the theodicy problem in the Malebranche-Arnauld-Leibniz debate / Dániel Schmal -- Lessing's anti-candide : between reason and revelation / Krisztina Utasi ; transl. Márton Dornbach. (shrink)

On 18–19 May 2018, a symposium was held in the Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies at the University of Aberdeen to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Ronald W. Hepburn (1927–2008). The speakers at this event discussed Hepburn’s oeuvre from several perspectives. For this book, the collection of the revised versions of their talks has been supplemented by the papers of other scholars who were unable to attend the symposium itself. Thus this volume contains contributions from (...) eighteen notable scholars of different disciplines, ranging from contemporary aesthetics and art theory through to philosophical approaches to religion, education and social anthropology. It also includes a bibliography of Hepburn’s writings. The essays were first published in two special issues of the Journal of Scottish Thought, vols. 10–11 (2018–2019). -/- Ronald William Hepburn was born in Aberdeen on 16 March 1927. He went to Aberdeen Grammar School, then he graduated with an M.A. in Philosophy (1951) and obtained his doctorate from the University of Aberdeen (1955). His tutor at Aberdeen was Donald MacKinnon (1913– 1994), a Scottish philosopher and theologian, the author of A Study in Ethical Theory (1957) and The Problem of Metaphysics (1974). Hepburn taught as Lecturer at the Department of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen (1956–60), and he was also Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University (1959–60). He returned from the United States as Professor of Philosophy at Nottingham University. In 1964, he was appointed as a Chair in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and between 1965 and 1968 he was also Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Cambridge. From 1975 until his retirement in 1996, he held the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. He died in Edinburgh on 23 December 2008. His philosophical interests ranged from theology and the philosophy of religion through moral philosophy and the philosophy of education to art theory and aesthetics. Notably, Hepburn is widely regarded as the founder of modern environmental and everyday aesthetics as a result of the influence of papers in the 1960s which pioneered a new approach to the aesthetics of the natural world. (shrink)

Das Sammelwerk legt umfassend den Stand der Staatstheorie dar und arbeitet die Beiträge der bedeutendsten Staatsdenker und der wichtigsten Strömungen des Staatsdenkens zum heutigen Staatsverständnis exemplarisch heraus.Renommierte Philosophen, Historiker, Sozial-, Kultur- und Rechtswissenschaftler aus Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen in ganz Europa stellen in 15 gleichgewichteten Kapiteln das Staatsdenken von der Antike bis zur Postdemokratie facettenreich heraus. Jedes Kapitel firmiert unter einem Schwerpunkt, angefangen beim klassischen und konservativen über das liberale und feministische bis hin zum anarchistischen und religiösen Staatsdenken. Einen besonderen Stellenwert (...) nimmt dabei das Staatsdenken in anderen Kulturen ein, darunter China, Indien, die arabische Welt sowie das vor- und das postkoloniale Afrika.Die Schlussbetrachtung zum "Staat der Zukunft" bilanziert die Probleme von Souveränitätsverlust, Staatszerfall und Postdemokratie vor dem Hintergrund von Globalisierung, Ökonomisierung und Individualisierung.Praktische Querverweise und ein umfassendes Literaturverzeichnis erleichtern den Zugriff, detaillierte Stichwort- und Personenregister runden das Werk ab.Mit Beiträgen von:Helga Albrecht, Andreas Anter, Olaf Asbach, Friedrich Balke, Ernst Baltrusch, Michael Becker, Hannah Bethke, Karl-Heinz Breier, Michael Brie, Norbert Campagna, Lars Distelhorst, Sabine Doyé, Dominik Finkelde, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Alexander Gantschow, Eva Geulen, Gerhard Göhler, Dieter Grimm, Martin Gronau, Gregor Hain, Hendrik Hansen, Leonhard Harding, Oliver Hidalgo, Wilhelm Hofmann, Frauke Höntzsch, Dana Ionescu, Matthias Jestaedt, Dirk Jörke, John Kannankulam, Stefan Koslowski, Oliver W. Lembcke, Rochus Leonhardt, Roland Lhotta, Mathias Lindenau, Marion Löffler, Gundula Ludwig, Günter Maschke, Jean-Christophe Merle, Dominique Fabian Miething, Andreas Niederberger, Claudia Opitz-Belakhal, Henning Ottmann, Gregor Paul, Thore Prien, Walter Reese-Schäfer, Claudia Ritzi, Samuel Salzborn, Stefano Saracino, Birgit Sauer, Peter Seyferth, Thomas Schölderle, Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann, Ulrich Seeber, Veith Selk, Harald Sippel, Tine Stein, Kazuhiro Takii, Ulrich Thiele, Andreas Vasilache, Rüdiger Voigt, Christian Wendt, Stefanie Wöhl, Joachim Wurst, Holger Zapf und Barbara Zehnpfennig. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) research enjoyed an initial period of enthusiasm in the 1970s and 80s. But this enthusiasm was tempered by a long interlude of frustration when genuinely useful AI applications failed to be forthcoming. Today, we are experiencing once again a period of enthusiasm, fired above all by the successes of the technology of deep neural networks or deep machine learning. In this paper we draw attention to what we take to be serious problems underlying current views of artificial (...) intelligence encouraged by these successes, especially in the domain of language processing. We then show an alternative approach to language-centric AI, in which we identify a role for philosophy. (shrink)

The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal (...) evidence from mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, and biology, setting up their book around three central questions: What are the essential marks of human intelligence? What is it that researchers try to do when they attempt to achieve "artificial intelligence" (AI)? And why, after more than 50 years, are our most common interactions with AI, for example with our bank’s computers, still so unsatisfactory? Landgrebe and Smith show how a widespread fear about AI’s potential to bring about radical changes in the nature of human beings and in the human social order is founded on an error. There is still, as they demonstrate in a final chapter, a great deal that AI can achieve which will benefit humanity. But these benefits will be achieved without the aid of systems that are more powerful than humans, which are as impossible as AI systems that are intrinsically "evil" or able to "will" a takeover of human society. (shrink)

We comment on the collection of papers inspired by our book Why Machines Will Never Rule the World published in volume 12 (5+6) of the journal Cosmos+Taxis. We summarize the arguments made by the contributors about what we say in the book, and then show where we disagree.

The view of nature we adopt in the natural attitude is determined by common sense, without which we could not survive. Classical physics is modelled on this common-sense view of nature, and uses mathematics to formalise our natural understanding of the causes and effects we observe in time and space when we select subsystems of nature for modelling. But in modern physics, we do not go beyond the realm of common sense by augmenting our knowledge of what is going on (...) in nature. Rather, we have measurements that we do not understand, so we know nothing about the ontology of what we measure. We help ourselves by using entities from mathematics, which we fully understand ontologically. But we have no ontology of the reality of modern physics; we have only what we can assert mathematically. In this paper, we describe the ontology of classical and modern physics against this background and show how it relates to the ontology of common sense and of mathematics. (shrink)

In this book the authors reconcile two different viewpoints of the foundations of mathematics, namely mathematical logic and category theory. In Part I, they show that typed lambda-calculi, a formulation of higher order logic, and cartesian closed categories are essentially the same. In Part II, it is demonstrated that another formulation of higher order logic is closely related to topos theory. Part III is devoted to recursive functions. Numerous applications of the close relationship between traditional logic and the algebraic language (...) of category theory are given. The authors have included an introduction to category theory and develop the necessary logic as required, making the book essentially self-contained. Detailed historical references are provided throughout, and each section concludes with a set of exercises. Thus it is well-suited for graduate courses and research in mathematics and logic. Researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and mathematical linguistics will also find this an accessible introduction to a subject of increasing application to these disciplines. (shrink)

The Historical Dictionary of Philosophy, the _Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,_ is distinguished by its particular presentation of philosophical terms, ideas and concepts. Rather than providing mere defintions or descriptive and analytical explanantions the _HWPh_ strictly applies the critical method of history of concepts developed by the eminent German scholar and philosopher Joachim Ritter. By means of precise and detailed references it documents the origin, first occurrence, the historical evolution and the changes of meaning of each concept, from Ancient Greek (...) to contemporary philosophy. For the reader this presentation is of unique value: it makes traceable the importance of terms and concepts at certain periods or for a particular philosopher, as well as its changes and development of meaning. Voulmes 1–12 of the _HWPh_ comprises more than 17.000 text columns on 3.670 philosophical terms. The dictionary does not include articles on persons. Volume 13 includes, besides of a comprehensive introductory essay, three different indexes: - the Subject Index classifies the articles by disciplinary and systematic categories - the Main Index includes all philosophical keywords with more than 30.000 references to their occurrences in other articles and contexts - the Author Index lists all authors and their contributions The included CD-ROM allows full text research of the _HWPh's_ entire content. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that knowledge in health care is a multidimensional dynamic construct, in contrast to the prevailing idea of knowledge being an objective state. Polanyi demonstrated that knowledge is personal, that knowledge is discovered, and that knowledge has explicit and tacit dimensions. Complex adaptive systems science views knowledge simultaneously as a thing and a flow, constructed as well as in constant flux. The Cynefin framework is one model to help our understanding of knowledge as a personal construct (...) achieved through sense making. Specific knowledge aspects temporarily reside in either one of four domains – the known, knowable, complex or chaotic, but new knowledge can only be created by challenging the known by moving it in and looping it through the other domains. Medical knowledge is simultaneously explicit and implicit with certain aspects already well known and easily transferable, and others that are not yet fully known and must still be learned. At the same time certain knowledge aspects are predominantly concerned with content, whereas others deal with context. Though in clinical care we may operate predominately in one knowledge domain, we also will operate some of the time in the others. Medical knowledge is inherently uncertain, and we require a context-driven flexible approach to knowledge discovery and application, in clinical practice as well as in health service planning. (shrink)

Implicit stochastic models, including both ‘deep neural networks’ (dNNs) and the more recent unsupervised foundational models, cannot be explained. That is, it cannot be determined how they work, because the interactions of the millions or billions of terms that are contained in their equations cannot be captured in the form of a causal model. Because users of stochastic AI systems would like to understand how they operate in order to be able to use them safely and reliably, there has emerged (...) a new field called ‘explainable AI’ (XAI). When we examine the XAI literature, however, it becomes apparent that its protagonists have redefined the term ‘explanation’ to mean something else, namely: ‘interpretation’. Interpretations are indeed sometimes possible, but we show that they give at best only a subjective understanding of how a model works. We propose an alternative to XAI, namely certified AI (CAI), and describe how an AI can be specified, realized, and tested in order to become certified. The resulting approach combines ontologies and formal logic with statistical learning to obtain reliable AI systems which can be safely used in technical applications. (shrink)

In this paper, we review and connect the three essential conditions needed by the collapse model to achieve a complete and exact formulation, namely the theoretical, the experimental, and the ontological ones. These features correspond to the three parts of the paper. In any empirical science, the first two features are obviously connected but, as is well known, among the different formulations and interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, only collapse models, as the paper well illustrates with a richness of details, (...) have experimental consequences. Finally, we show that a clarification of the ontological intimations of collapse models is needed for at least three reasons: (1) to respond to the indispensable task of answering the question ’what are collapse models (and in general any physical theory) about?’; (2) to achieve a deeper understanding of their different formulations; (3) to enlarge the panorama of possible readings of a theory, which historically has often played a fundamental heuristic role. (shrink)

ABSTRACT George Berkeley is usually not discussed in the canonical histories of modern aesthetics. Similarly, Berkeley scholars do not seem to have paid attention to his possible contribution to modern aesthetics. Berkeley exploited certain theoretical potentials of the emerging aesthetic experience that was invented and formulated especially by his contemporaries like Joseph Addison, Richard Steele and Lord Shaftesbury. He applied these elements in shaping a theologico-aesthetic language in the very same period when Francis Hutcheson and Alexander Baumgarten wrote their widely (...) acclaimed first aesthetic theories in Europe. At the same time, Berkeley advances the linguistic and religious aspects of the modern aesthetic experience not in his theoretical, but in his pragmatical and popularizing writings. Instead of relying on a purely rational theology or a negative theology, he offers an ‘aesthetic’ one based on the model of the beautiful and the sublime. Aesthetically, this meant a re-interpretation and re-configuration of the duality of the beautiful and the sublime – decades before Edmund Burke's Philosophical Enquiry. (shrink)

Since the noun phrase `artificial intelligence' (AI) was coined, it has been debated whether humans are able to create intelligence using technology. We shed new light on this question from the point of view of themodynamics and mathematics. First, we define what it is to be an agent (device) that could be the bearer of AI. Then we show that the mainstream definitions of `intelligence' proposed by Hutter and others and still accepted by the AI community are too weak even (...) to capture what is involved when we ascribe intelligence to an insect. We then summarise the highly useful definition of basic (arthropod) intelligence proposed by Rodney Brooks, and we identify the properties that an AI agent would need to possess in order to be the bearer of intelligence by this definition. Finally, we show that, from the perspective of the disciplines needed to create such an agent, namely mathematics and physics, these properties are realisable by neither implicit nor explicit mathematical design nor by setting up an environment in which an AI could evolve spontaneously. (shrink)

Because they involve individual-level cognitive processes, psychological explanations of linguistic phenomena are in principle testable against individual behaviour. The present study draws on patterns of individual variation in corpus data to test explanations of productivity. Linguistic patterns are predicted to become more productive with higher type frequencies and lower token frequencies. This is because the formation of abstract mental representations is encouraged by varied types but counteracted by automation of high-frequency types. The predictions are tested for English -ly and -ness-derivation, (...) as used by 698 individual journalists in the New York Times Annotated Corpus and 171 members of Parliament in the Hansard Corpus. Linear regression is used to model individual variation in productivity, in relation to type and token frequency, as well as several other predictor variables. While the expected effects are observed, there is also robust evidence of an interaction effect between type and token frequency, indicating that productivity is highest for patterns with many types and not-too-infrequent tokens. This fits best with a view of entrenchment as both a conservative and creative force in language. Further, some variation remains irreducibly individual and is not explained by currently known predictors of productivity. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss three interrelated questions. First: is explanation in mathematics a topic that philosophers of mathematics can legitimately investigate? Second: are the specific aims that philosophers of mathematical explanation set themselves legitimate? Finally: are the models of explanation developed by philosophers of science useful tools for philosophers of mathematical explanation? We argue that the answer to all these questions is positive. Our views are completely opposite to the views that Mark Zelcer has put forward recently. Throughout this (...) paper, we show why Zelcer’s arguments fail. (shrink)

The extent to which machine metaphors are used in synthetic biology is striking. These metaphors contain a specific perspective on organisms as well as on scientific and technological progress. Expressions such as “genetically engineered machine”, “genetic circuit”, and “platform organism”, taken from the realms of electronic engineering, car manufacturing, and information technology, highlight specific aspects of the functioning of living beings while at the same time hiding others, such as evolutionary change and interdependencies in ecosystems. Since these latter aspects are (...) relevant for, for example, risk evaluation of uncontained uses of synthetic organisms, it is ethically imperative to resist the thrust of machine metaphors in this respect. In addition, from the perspective of the machine metaphor viewing an entity as a moral agent or patient becomes dubious. If one were to regard living beings, including humans, as machines, it becomes difficult to justify ascriptions of moral status. Finally, the machine metaphor reinforces beliefs in the potential of synthetic biology to play a decisive role in solving societal problems, and downplays the role of alternative technological, and social and political measures. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a general constraint on theories of knowledge that we call ‘normalism’. Normalism is a view about the epistemic threshold that separates knowledge from mere true belief; its basic claim is that one knows only if one has at least a normal amount of epistemic support for one’s belief. We argue that something like normalism is required to do full justice to the normative role of knowledge in many key everyday practices, such as assertion, inquiry, and (...) testimony. The view of normality we employ to flesh out this claim is inspired by experimental work on the folk notion of normality, which suggests that folk judgments of what is ‘normal’ are based upon both statistical averages as well as normative ideals within the relevant target domain. Adopting this notion of normality to set the threshold for knowledge results in a view upon which knowledge is routinely available on an everyday basis without being a merely trivial achievement. We explore several interesting consequences of this view, including the implication that the threshold for knowing may change as, e.g., the ease of availability of information in an epistemic community changes over time. The result is a ‘shifty’ view of knowledge which nonetheless retains more stability than standard contextualist or pragmatic encroachment approaches. (shrink)

We are never illness or disease, but, rather, always their sum in the world of day-to-day experience. Disease and illness are not closed systems, but mutually constitutive and continuously interacting worlds. In the patient’s case it is always experience as well. Pain, sickness and death help make that particular experienced identity unavoidable, and at some level ultimately inaccessible to medicine’s changing understanding of disease and tools for managing it. Health—rather than cost containment, specific conditions, or technologies—should be the central focus (...) for health care and health-care reform. A compelling reason to focus on health comes from the observation that the prevalence of disease over the .. (shrink)

This paper discusses some essays from London daily journals at the time of the emergence of modern aesthetics and attempts to demonstrate that what we nowadays call “everyday aesthetics” was not simply present in the relevant texts of the early eighteenth century, but, in a sense, it was the mainstream of the rising modern aesthetic. The aesthetic basically meant paying closer attention to our everyday reality including our natural and human made environments and also various quotidian activities. Contemporary everyday aesthetics (...) should therefore be seen not so much as an extension of the mostly “art-centred” post-Kantian philosophical aesthetics, but rather as one of the original, pre-Kantian, sources of modern aesthetics to be restored or regained. (shrink)

Barry Smith recently discussed the diagraphs of book eight of Jacob Lorhard’s Ogdoas scholastica under the heading “birth of ontology” (Smith, 2022; this issue). Here, I highlight the commonalities between the original usage of diagraphs in the tradition of Ramus for didactic purposes and the the usage of their present-day successors–modern ontologies–for computational purposes. The modern ideas of ontology and of the universal computer were born just two generations apart in the breakthrough century of instrumental reason.

First encounters : Jesuit logica in the late Ming and early Qing -- Haphazard overtures : logic in nineteenth-century Protestant writings -- Great expectations : Yan Fu and the discovery of European logic -- Spreading the word : logic in late Qing education and popular discourse -- Heritage unearthed : the discovery of Chinese logic -- Textbooks on logic adapted from Japanese, 1902-1911 -- Logical terms in early-twentieth-century textbooks.

We discuss two models of virtue cultivation that are present throughout the Republic: the self-mastery model and the harmony model. Schultz (2013) discusses them at length in her recent book, Plato’s Socrates as Narrator: A Philosophical Muse. We bring this Socratic distinction into conversation with two modes of intentional regulation strategies articulated by James J. Gross. These strategies are expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. We argue that that the Socratic distinction helps us see the value in cognitive reappraisal and (...) that the contemporary neurological research supports the wide range of attitudes toward the value of emotional experience that mirror those found in the Republic. (shrink)

In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the (...) infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know. (shrink)

Enhancement, the improvement of mental capacities with psychoactive substances and technologies has stimulated one of the largest debates in contemporary bioethics. Surprisingly few participants in this debate take note of the tendentious legal status of psychoactive pharmaceuticals as the primary means of enhancement. -/- Enhancement technologies and substances have measurable effects on specific measurable cognitive functions. A major issue of contention in the debate is how to evaluate these effects, i. e. which theory of value to use. It is contested (...) whether the pleasures and achievements resulting from the use of enhancement can be counted as such or can be ignored or devaluate by calling them fraudulent or inauthentic. -/- The alleged and real benefits of enhancement are not expected to be evenly distributed, nor is it always clear whether enhancement is a zero-sum game or has benefits even for the non-users. This results in a complex structure of risks and benefits for individuals and groups, which needs to be broken down in detail. (shrink)

The goal of creating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) – or in other words of creating Turing machines (modern computers) that can behave in a way that mimics human intelligence – has occupied AI researchers ever since the idea of AI was first proposed. One common theme in these discussions is the thesis that the ability of a machine to conduct convincing dialogues with human beings can serve as at least a sufficient criterion of AGI. We argue that this very ability (...) should be accepted also as a necessary condition of AGI, and we provide a description of the nature of human dialogue in particular and of human language in general against this background. We then argue that it is for mathematical reasons impossible to program a machine in such a way that it could master human dialogue behaviour in its full generality. This is (1) because there are no traditional explicitly designed mathematical models that could be used as a starting point for creating such programs; and (2) because even the sorts of automated models generated by using machine learning, which have been used successfully in areas such as machine translation, cannot be extended to cope with human dialogue. If this is so, then we can conclude that a Turing machine also cannot possess AGI, because it fails to fulfil a necessary condition thereof. At the same time, however, we acknowledge the potential of Turing machines to master dialogue behaviour in highly restricted contexts, where what is called “narrow” AI can still be of considerable utility. (shrink)

The article considers the concept of gustus spiritualis, in particular its possible historical connection with (aesthetic) taste in the seventeenth century. By ‘aesthetic’, I mean a radically modern phenomenon, attitude, sensibility, and so forth, that is, a new type of experience. Its discourse has many keywords; one of them is taste, an inner faculty by which its possessor is able to make sharp and proper distinctions, and simultaneously to enjoy fine delights. Here, I am obliged to confine myself to the (...) interpretation of some Jesuit authors within the wide tradition of gustus spiritualis: St Ignatius of Loyola, St Francis de Sales, Baltasar Gracián, and Dominique Bouhours in sequence. The latter two are usually treated in the historical narratives of aesthetics, which, however, usually take gustus/gusto/goût as if it were a purely secular (moral, political) notion in the seventeenth century, while its theological roots are ignored. Exploring the role of gustus spiritualis in the evolution of (aesthetic) taste can cast light, on the one hand, on the important fact that this entails volition, that is, the determination and enchantment of human desire and hope without constraint; and, on the other, on the historical process of the emergence of a new type of ‘beholder’ with a sensitive attitude to transcendence, and, in the same manner, to his or her worldly life as well; moreover, it is a process in which, simultaneously, the nature of transcendence is transformed into a tastable one. (shrink)

Health Level 7 (HL7) is an international standards development organisation in the domain of healthcare information technology. Initially the mission of HL7 was to enable data exchange via the creation of syntactic standards which supported point-to-point messaging. Currently HL7 sees its mission as one of creating standards for semantic interoperability in healthcare IT on the basis of its flagship “version 3” (v3). Unfortunately, v3 has been plagued by quality and consistency issues, and it has not been able to keep pace (...) with recent developments either in semantics and ontology or in computer science and engineering. HL7’s response has been to develop its “Services-Aware Interoperability Framework” (SAIF), which is intended to provide a foundation for work on all aspects of standardization in HL7 henceforth. We here summarise the major design principles that must be satisfied by a semantic interoperability framework – principles relating both to static semantics and to computational behaviour. We then assess the SAIF in light of these principles. We conclude that the SAIF is not in a position to support the needed reform of the HL7 v3 family of standards. (shrink)

Transcript of an Interview on the podcast: Irreverend: Faith and Current Affairs.